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INTRODUCTION 
The present note is prepared to support a discussion on a set 
of categories which can be used in industrial incident and event 
reports to ensure collection of adequate information for improve-
ment of human work situations and man-machine interface systems 
as well as for attempts to quantify "human error" rates. 
Discussion of taxonomies to describe human tasks, performance 
and errors seems to be an everlasting activity among human factors 
specialists and the field is not very attractive after several 
not too successful attempts. However, if one wishes to quantify 
human errors, one has to identify and define the items one wants 
to count or measure and unless the development of modern tnan-
-machine interfaces should be controlled by piecemeal remedies 
after spectacular man-machine misfits - such as e.g. TMI - it 
is necessary to use models of human performance and define cate-
gories of problems. The basic issue is, prob.tbly, that one has 
to accept that the structure and members of a proper taxonomy 
depend very much on the intended use and th«i specific aspects 
of the work situation. One important presert aspect is the rapid 
change in level of automation and in desigi of interface caused 
by modern information technology. Consequently, human work situ-
ation changes and the taxonomy used must oe helpful for transfer 
of empirical data to new task designs. 
The structure of the taxonomy 
To be able to quantify the frequency of inappropriate human acts 
in a meaningful way, it is necessary to separate cases of intrin-
sic human variability and spontaneous human errors from cases 
of psychologically normal human reactions to external events 
or changes in the work situation, "his means that a simple classi-
fication of human errors with reference to the task sequence 
in terms of omission, commission, timing errors etc. is not ade-
quate. Careful efforts should be spent to identify potential 
external causes with reference co categories which allow estimates 
of frequencies in another particular situation. 
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To serve as a basis for more error tolerant task and equipment 
design, more fundamental understanding of human malfunction in 
industrial work situations is needed. Event reports are an extreme-
ly valuable data source for such research, but for this purpose 
it '^ important to use a taxonomy which serve to represent the 
circumstances preceding and succeeding the event of human mal-
function and the relation to the human task, and maintain this 
information in the data recorded. This leads to a raultifacetted 
description of the human involvement in system failures as shown 
in Figure 1, rather than a classical, heirarchical and exclusive 
classification system. 
The structure of this taxonomy is more important than the detailed 
classes related to the different facets. Some of these will depend 
on the specific system in question; others are preliminary classes 
which should be refined by future data collection and analysis. 
Therefore, free text comments and descriptions in the reports 
are necessary and the facets used in the present taxonomy can 
serve to indicate the type of information needed. 
Emphasis has been given to obtain compatibility between the human 
malfunction taxonomy and the taxonomy of the European Reliability 
Data System under development at ISPRA (Mancini et al. 1979). 
The combination of the taxonomies is described in the following. 
PERFORMANCE SHAPING FACTORS 
- Subjective goals and intentions 
- Mental load, resources 
- Affective factors 
1 
SITUATION FACTORS 
- Task characteristics 
- Physical environment 
- Work time characteristics 
CAUSES OF HUMAN MALFUNCTION 
- External events 
(distraction, etc.) 
- Excessive task demand 
(force, tint, knowledge, etc.) 
- Operator incapacitated 
(sickness, etc.) 
- Intrinsic human variability 
MECHANISMS OF HUMAN MALFUNCTION 
- Discrimination 
. stereotype fixation 
. familiar short-cut 
. stereotype take-over 
. familiar pattern not 
recognized 
- Input information processing 
. information not received 
. misinterpretation 
. assumption 
- Recall 
. forget isolated act 
. mistake alternatives 
. other slip of memory 
- Inference 
. condition or side effect 
not considered 
- Physical coordination 
. motor variability 
. spatial misorientation 
PERSONNEL TASK 
- Equipment design 
- Procedure deslgr 
- Fabrication 
- Installation 
• Inspection 
- Operation 
- Test and cal ibrat ion 
- Maintenance, repair 
- Logistics 
- Administration 
- Management 
T 
INTERNAL HUMAN MAUFUflCTIOW 
- Detection 
- Identification 
- Decision 
. select goal 
. select target 
, select task 
- Action 
. procedure 
. . execution 
, communication 
I 
EXTERNAL MODE OF MAI.FUHCTI>'» 
- Specified task net performed 
. omission of act 
. inaccurate perform«!)..« 
, wrung timing 
- Commission of 'irroneou* n.l 
• Commission of extraneous »<:i 
- Sneak-path, «.--ia»nu. I timing 
of several »vente or faults 
! I 
Figure 1. Mul tifacetted taxonomy for description and analysis of events involving human 
malfunction. 
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Collection of data, general 
The means of data collection are tightly coupled to the taxonomy 
and its purpose: They should together constitute a good compromise 
between Lhe following requirements: 
- The reporting procedure should not be too difficult or require 
special insight (e.g. in human factors) in excess of what 
is reasonable from the people involved in reporting. 
- The information reported should be covering and unambiguous 
with respect to its intended use. 
It is foreseen that a. good compromise can be developed only by 
an iterative process: the experiences from the practical event 
reporting and use of the information collected can be expected 
to lead to changes of both the reporting procedure and the tax-
onomy. 
The above will be discussed more detailed in the following, refer-
ring to Figure 2, where the categories of the taxonomy are re-
lated to their use for event reporting and for analysis. 
In order to facilitate event recording, preprinted forms will 
be used for categories, where reporting can be done in-plant 
by filling in such forms like checklists. At the outset the follo-
wing categories are considered suitable for this kind of report-
ing: 
- PLANT: 
PLANT IDENTIFICATION 
DATA SYSTEM .IDENTIFICATION 
- EVENT ANALYSIS: 
EVENT DETECTION 
PLANT STATE 
SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS AFFECTED 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE EVENT 
RECOVERY SITUATION 
- COMPONENT RELIABILITY DATA SYSTEM: 
MODES OF FAILURE 
CAUSES OF FAILURE 
ACTIONS TAKEN 
- HUMAN SYSTEM: 
PERSONNEL IDENTIFICATION 
PERSONNEL LOCATION 
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PLANT 
A PLANT IDENTIFICATION 
B DATA SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION 
EVENT ANALYSIS 
C FREE TEXT EVENT DESCRIPTION 
D EVENT DETECTION 
E PLANT STATE 
SYSTEMS (F) AND COMPONENTS (H) 
AFFECTED 
G CONSEQUENCES OF THE EVENT 
U RECOVERY SITUATION 
7 
COMPONENT RELIABILITY 
DATA SYSTEM 
HM MODES OF FAILURE 
HC CAUSES OF FAILURE' 
HA ACTIONS TAKEN 
FILLING-IN 
PREPRINTED FORMS 
DATA COLLECTION BY f 
SPECIALISTS' ANALYSIS, 
IN-PLANT INTERVIEWS ETC. 
SPECIALISTS' ANALYSIS, 
PRESELECTED TASK TYPES 
HUMAN FACTORS DATA 
HUMAn SYSTEM: 
J PERSONNEL IDENTIFICATION 
K PERSONNEL LOCATION 
L PERSONNEL TASK 
M EXTERNAL MODE OF MALFUNCTION 
N POTENTIAL FOR SELF-CORRECTION 
P SITUATION FACTORS 
HA ACTIONS TAKEN 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS 
HF SPECIALISTS' ANALYSIS; 
Q INTERNAL HUMAN MALFUNCTION 
R CAUSES OF HUMAN MALFUNCTION 
S MECHANISMS OF HUMAN MALFUNCTION 
T PERFORMANCE SHAPING FACTORS 
HA ACTIONS TAKEN 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS 
QUANTIFICATION 
Figure 2: Use of human malfunction taxonomy. 
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PERSONNEL TASK 
EXTERNAL MODE OF MALFUNCTION 
POTENTIAL FOR SELF-CORRECTION 
SITUATION FACTORS 
ACTIONS TAKEN 
The preprinted forms and examples of their use are presented 
in the document SINDOC (81)15. 
FREE TEXT EVENT DESCRIPTION is intended for a short general de-
scription, abt. 10 lines of text. 
The category U: RECOVERY SITUATION has been reserved for the 
purpose of characterizing the short term remedies applied in 
order to cope with a particular event. This category should be 
distinguished from categories HA: COMPONENTS: ACTIONS TAKEN and 
HA: ACTIONS TAKEN describing the long term remedies applied. 
RECOVERY SITUATION has not yet been provided with subcategories 
and will not be discussed further in this report. 
The categories SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS AFFECTED are intended for 
characterization of both technical failures and human malfunctions. 
In case of a technical failure the classification thereafter 
will continue in the COMPONENT RELIABILITY DATA SYSTEM indicated 
by H in figure 2, specifying MODES and CAUSES OF FAILURE and 
ACTIONS TAKEN. In case of a human malfunction, SYSTEMS AND COM-
PONENTS AFFECTED will specify the physical contact/interface 
between the technical system and the human activity, as explained 
later in the comments given to this category. 
The RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS under HUMAN FACTORS DATA are 
intended for supplementary information for the categories under 
HUMAN SYSTEM and, particularly, for supporting the more subtle 
classification under the categories: 
- HF SPECIALISTS' ANALYSIS: 
INTERNAL HUMAN MALFUNCTION 
CAUSES OF HUMAN MALFUNCTION 
MECHANISMS OF HUMAJJ MALFUNCTION 
PERFORMANCE SHAPING FACTORS 
ACTIONS TAKEN 
The classification of these categories is considered to need 
human factors specialists' analysis, at least in the beginning, 
and also will involve e.g. in-plant interviews. 
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As indicated in Figure 2. the categories under PLAXT and EVOtT 
ANALYSIS are expected to be common to the component reliability 
data system under developaent at ISPftA (Kancini et al. It7f) 
and the taxonoay discussed in this report. 
In case of events involving several subevents, «-t- coaponent 
failure and huaan aalfunction or several huaan malfunctions, 
the free text description and the three categories A, 9 and D 
could be coaaon to the si bevents, these being thereafter classi-
fied as independent events. 
Collection of data for quantification 
When data collection is planned for quantification of huaan error 
rates special categories of information aust be derived fro« 
task analysis. 
- "Denominator1* information aust be found, i.e. the frequency 
of opportunity for the relevant categories of huaan aalfunc-
tion. For soae spontaneous huaan errors this frequency is 
related to the task frequency; for Malfunctions with external 
causes the relation to task frequency is aore coapiex and 
the task frequency can only be used as denoainator for esti-
mation of error rates in work situations very similar to those 
of the plant s«rving as data source. 
- Recovery factors: for use in quantification of human malfunc-
tion, features of the work situation related to the potential 
for detection of errors by the person himself is very important 
and should be emphasized in the task analysis aiming at deno-
minators. 
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A PLANT IDENTIFICATION 
Al Power r e a c t o r s : 
A l . 1 BWR 
A l . 2 PWR 
A1.3 Gascooled r e a c t o r s , AGR, Magnox 
A1.4 Fas t b r e e d e r r e a c t o r s 
A1.5 Heavy wa te r r e a c t o r s 
A2 Research r e a c t o r s 
A3 O t h e r . Fuel manufac tu r ing and r e p r o c e s s i n g , t r a n s p o r t 
e t c . 
Comments 
In a data retrieval system extended to more industrial branches 
than that of nuclear power, the specific branches could be typi-
fied according to existing proven indexing systems. 
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B DATA SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION 
Comments 
The content of this category, having not yet been worked out 
in details, should include descriptors characterizing items such 
as: 
- Identification code for the data system in relation to other 
corresponding data systems. 
- Whether or not the event is comprising several subevents. 
- Individual code numbers for the reported event and subevents, 
if any, also covering follow-up or supplementary information 
reported after the preliminary event report. 
- Date of event occurrence and date of report. 
- Individual code number for the power station unit (reactor) 
involved. 
- 14 -
D EVENT DETECTION 
Dl Announced by automatic alarm 
D2 During maintenance: 
D2.1 Planned/preventive 
D2.2 Repair/modification 
D3 During t^st or special inspection 
D4 During operational activities 
(excluding automatic alarm announcing): 
D4.1 Preparatory activities 
D4.2 When calling system into operation 
D4.3 Routine surveillance during operation 
D4.4 Other not covered above 
D5 During management activities: 
D5.1 Review of log, recorder charts 
D5.2 Other 
D6 Malfunction "seen, found" without further specification 
D7 Not stated, not applicable 
Comments 
Event detection, i.e. information regarding the way the abnor-
mality was detected, is important to judge the role and quality 
of the various measures to monitor the operational state of the 
system. The information also makes it possible to estimate the 
time interval from different categories of technical faults and 
inappropriate human acts to their detection. 
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PLANT STATE 
El Under construction 
E2 Preoperational, startup or pjwer ascension tests 
(in progress) 
E3 Routine startup operations 
E4 Routine shutdown operations 
E5 Steady state operation 
E6 Stretch-out operation 
E7 Load changes during routine power operation 
E8 Shutdown (hot or cold) except refueling 
E9 Refueling 
E10 Other (including special tests, emergency shutdown 
operations, etc.) 
Ell Not applicable, not stated 
Comments 
The plant state should refer to the occurrence of the malfunc-
tion. (The recognition of the malfunction is classified under 
the category: EVENT DETECTION). 
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SYSTEMS (F) AND COMPONENTS (H) AFFECTED 
F Systems 
F A - NUCLEAR HEAT SYSTEM 
FAl - Pveactor Core S y s t e m 
F A2 - Reactor V e s s e l Equipment 
F A 3 - Pr imary Coolant S y s t e m (PWH.) 
FA4 - Pres sur i z ing Sys tem (PWR) 
F A 5 - Steam Generator System (PWR) 
FA6 - Recirculating Water Sys tem (3WR) 
FA" - Coolant System (3W?.) 
FAS - CoatroL Rod Sys tem (PW?») 
F A ? - Control Ro<i S y s t e m (3WR) 
F 3 - EN*G3TEERE2 SAFETY FEATURES 
F 3 i - Reactor Containment Sys tem (PWR) 
Fai - Aeac-or C w a s ^ * - . - : C ^ t s m (2 "."?.) 
F 3 3 - Containment Spray System 
F3-i - Containment Isolation Sys tem 
F 3 5 - Containment P r e s s u r e Suppress ion Sys tem (3W?„) 
F ? " - P r e s s u r e Relief System (PWR.) 
F 3 " * H**droc*n Vjtirl;r.'T ^••<^**T* 
F 3 S - Pos t -Acc iden: Containment A s i i o i k e r e Mixir-g System 
F 3 ? - Containment Gas Control o y s t e m 
F 3 - 0 - Auxiliary F e e c w a t e r Sys tem (PWR.) 
F 3 i i - Reactor Core e o l a t i o n Cooling Sys tem (3WR) 
F312 - Emergency 3ora t ion Sys tem (PWR) 
F 3 I 3 - Stand-by Liquid Control System'(SWR.) 
F314 - Residual Heat Removal Sys tem (PWR) 
F315 - P.esicual Heat Removal Sys tem (3WR) 
F316 - High P r e s s u r e Coolant Injection System (PWR) 
F31T - Accumulation Sys tem (PWR) 
FBI3 - Low P r e s s u r e Coolant Injection Sys tem (PWR) 
FBI 9 - Nuclear S o i l e r Overpressure Protec t ion S /3 :em (3WR) 
F320 - High P r e s s u r e Core Spray Sys tem (3WR) 
F321 - High P r e s s u r e Coolant Injection Sys tem (3WR) 
F322 - Low P r e s s u r e C e r e Spray S y s t e m (BWR) 
F323 - Low P r e s s u r e Coolant Injection Sys tem (3WR) 
F C - REACTOR AUXILIARY SYSTEM 
FC1 - Chemical and Volume Control System (PWR) 
FC2 - Reactor Water Cleanup System (3WR) 
FC3 - 3oron Recovery System (PWR.) 
FC4 - Reactor Treated Water Storage Sys tem (PWR) 
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pC5 - Primary Component Cooling Water System 
FC6 - Control Rod Drive Cooling Water System (PWR) 
F.C7 . Primary Loads Service Water System 
FC8 - Ultimate Heat Sink System 
FC? - Refueling Water System 
FC10 - Reactor Water Storage System (3WR) 
FCH - Radwasta Cooling Water System 
FC12 - Safety Equipment Compressed Air System 
FC13 - Nuclear System Fire Protection System 
FC14 - Hydrogen, Oxygen, Nitrogen Cas Distribution System 
FC15 - Nuclear System 3uilding Servicing Equipment 
FD - FUEL STORAGE AND HANDLING SYSTEM 
FDl - Fuel Storage and Handling Equipment 
FD2 • Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System 
FD3 - Containment Pool Cooling and Cleanup System (3WR) 
FE - RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
FE1 - Liquid Racwaste System 
FE2 - Solid Radwaste System 
FE3 - Gaseous Racwaste System (PWR) 
FE4 - Gaseous ?.adwa3te System (3WR) 
FE5 - Equipment and Floor Drainage System 
FE6 - Recovered Water Storage and" Distribution System 
FE7 - Steam Generator Slowdown System (?W3.) 
FF - STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM 
FFl - Main Steam Sys'.ern 
. FF2 - Turbine System 
FF2 Turbine Stczm S i i l i n - S'-ttsm 
FF4 - Mair. Condenser System 
FF5 - ?Tor.-C irv?s~zz'^.z ^ist^t F.x*'~?'**f'*", '"*?**TI 
FF6 - Turbine Bypass Sys:em 
FF7 - Steam Extraction System 
FF8 - Condensate and Feedwater System 
FF9 - Moisture Separators, Reheat«rs System 
FFIO • Moisture Separators, Reheaters Drain System 
FF11 - Heaters Drain and Vents System 
FFl 2 -Various Thermal Cycle Drains and Vents System 
FF13 - Chemical Additive Injection System 
FF14 - f".nnA*-,%*rm TVTi'nffr.iWrmr ,5vst«m 
FFl 5 - Circulating Water System (open eye'.«} 
FFio - Circulating V/atsr System (clcscd cycle) 
FF17 - Circulating Water Treatment System 
FFl8 - Cooling Towers System 
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F G - POWE3. TRANSMISSION SYSTEM 
. FG1 - Generator S y s t e m 
FG2 - Main 3 u s Duct Sys tem 
FG3 • Maia T r a n s f o r m e r s S y s t e m 
FG4 - Auxil iary T r a n s f o r m e r s S y s t e m 
FG5 - 5 » c k - u p Auxil iary T r a n s f o r m e r s Sys tem 
FG6 - Switchyard to Station H. V. Connection 
F H - ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM 
FHl - Medium Voltage S y s t e m 
FH2 - Low Voltage S y s t e m 
FH3 - Vital Instrument and Computer A. C. S y s t e m 
FK4 - O a - S L t e D . C. Sys tem 
FH5 - D i e s e l Generator Sys tem 
F H 6 - E l e c t r i c a l Heat Trac ing Svstem, 
FH"7 - T->hrinf ard Tvced Motive F e w e r Svs tem 
FH3 - Security S y s t e m 
F*-'3 - Communication S y s t e m 
FH10 - Cathcdic Protec t ion S y s t e m 
FHil - Grounding Sys tem 
FI - INSTRUMENTATION, SUPERVISION, MONITORING SYSTEM 
FI*. - Com put* r Sys tem 
FI2 .'-l' rrr Sys tem 
FI3 - Main Control Room Senenboards System 
FI4 - In-Core and Ex-C o re Neutron Monitoring System 
FI5 - Radiation Monitoring S y s t e m 
FI6 - Reactor Coolant P r e s s u r e Boundary Leak Detect ion Syster 
Fl~ - Containment Leak Detection. S/'s:em 
FIS - "ai led "uel Detect ion System (PWR) 
FI? - Main Steam Line Radiation Monitoring Sys tem (S'.VR) 
FliO - Hydrogen Monitoring Sys tem (3V/R) 
Fi l l - C££-Si:e ?j ,diological Monitoring System 
FI12 - Se i smic Monitoring System 
FI13 - Meteorological Monitoring Sys tem 
FI14 - Sampling Sys tem 
FI15 - Perturbographic Sys tem 
FI16 - Cooling Water Temperature Monitoring System 
FL - PROTECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEM 
Fl.l - Reactor Protect ion Sys t sm 
FL2 - 3 0 P Protect ion S y s t e m 
FL3 - Engineered Safety Features Actuation System 
FL4 - ?»eactor Power Control System (?W?„) 
FL5 - Reactor Power Control System (3W2.) 
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FL6 - Recirculation Flow Control System (3WR) 
FL7 - Feedwater Control. System (3WR) 
FL3 - Pressure Regu^itor System (3WR) 
FL9 - Turbine Control. System 
FL10 - Remote Shutdown System 
FLU - Remote Control Logic System 
FM - PLANT BUILDINGS HVAC SYSTEM 
FM1 - Containment Recirculation Air Cooling System 
FM2 - Containment Air Purification and Cleanup System (PWR) 
FM3 - Drywell Recirculation Air Cooling System (3WR) 
FM4 - Containment Purge System 
FM5 - Containment Low Purge and Pressure Control System (3WR) 
FM6 - Drywell Purge System (3WR) 
FM7 - Containment Pressure Relief System (PWR) 
FM3 - Anulus Recirculation and Exhaust System 
FM9 - In«Core Instrumentation Purge System 
FM10 - Control Rod Drive Mechanism Cooling System (P1*"?,) 
FM!! - P.eactor Auxiliary Building HVAC System 
FM12 - Control Room 3uilding HVAC System 
FM13 - Fuel Building HVAC System 
FM1+ - Emergency Diesel Generator Building HVAC System 
FM13 - Radwaste Building HVAC System 
FMI6 - Solid Waste Storage KVAC System 
FM17 - ESF Vaults HVAC System 
FM18 - Controlled Arsa Service 3uiLdiag HVAC System 
FM19 - Ultimate SirJc Structure HVAC Sysr-m 
FM20 - Main Pipe C'-ase HVAC System 
FM21 • Interb-T*Icings Corridors and Tunnels HVAC System 
FM22 - Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Chase HVAC System (PWR) 
FM23 - Plan: Stack and Vent Air Discharge System 
ni l« 1 - T-r'iir.- ^-.fir* HVAC System fPWR) 
FM25 - Turbine 3uildir.g HVAC System (3WR) 
FVfn - WIT--~ss<*ntial Switchgear Building KVAC System 
FM27 - General Service Building H V A C System 
FN - SERVICE AUXILIARY SYSTEM 
FN! - Service Water System 
FN2 - 3 C ? Cooling Water System 
FN3 - Chilled Water System 
F N 4 - Demiseralized Water Production and Distribution System 
^N'3 - Saw Water Ma.<e-up System 
FN'6 - Pretreared Watsr Distribution System 
FN7 - Potab> and Sanitary Water System 
FN3 - Auxiliary Steam and Hot Water System 
FN<? . Auxiliary 3oiler 
FN10 - Non-Radioactive Wastp Treatment Systsm 
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?N*i: - Serv ice and -Mtrumeiir Car-pressed Air Sys tem 
FN'12 - 3 0 ? Sa=n?lii.g Sys-ren: 
FNL3 - Izd'istrial '.Varer S y s - e m 
FN14 - Diaphragm 3 i i l i = 5 System 
FN15 - 3 0 P F i r s F i ; h u ^ s System 
F>T16 - Service Equipmees System 
FO - ST3.VCT'J3-A»L SYSTZNIS 
F O l - Reactor Auxi l iary Building 
F 0 2 - Fuel Storage S u i l d i s ? 
F 0 3 - Turbine, C o n c e s s a : e T r e a t i e s : ir.d Hearer 3ay 3uilcir.g 
F C4 - S S F Vaults 
F 0 5 - Radwaste Trearme:^ Suilding and TarJt Farm 
FC6 - Solid MTaste Scoraze Structure 
FO" - Control F.oorr. 3tiilci:LZ 
FCS - Z m e r j e n c y CJiesei. Generator 3uiLcin£3 and D i s i i . G«- . i : 
F-iel Storage 
F O 0 - 'Jlrimate Heat Sink Structure 
FCiO - Controlled A r - a Serv ice 3uil<lins 
F O I i • CiTC-ilzzir-i 7/s.:er Structure 
FC12 - .Viircella-sous SJiarec Building« ar.d Structure. 
H Components 
Hl ANNUCIATOR MODULES 
H1A Audio 
HIB Visua l 
Hic Audio /Visual 
H2 MECHANICAL FUNCTION UNITS 
H2A Controller/Governor 
H2B Coupling 
H2C Pover Transmission Device 
H3 PENETRATIONS. PRIMARY CONTAINMENT 
H3A Personnel Access 
H 3 B
 Fuel Handling 
H3C Equipment Acsss 
H3D Electrical 
H3E instrument Line 
H3F Procft<?« Pioina 
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H i l CIRCUIT CICSER/INTERRUPTERS 
H4 R^CCI-glNERS 
H4A Flame 
H4B Catalytic 
H4C Thermal 
H5 RELAYS 
H6 SHOCK SUFRESSORS/SUPPCRT 
H6A Hangers 
H6B Supports 
H6C stabilizers 
H6D snubbers 
H7 GENERATORS 
H7A Alternator 
H7B Converter 
H7C Dynamotor 
H7D Generator 
H7E Amplidyne 
H7F inverter 
H8FUEL ELEMENTS 
H9 VESSELS 
H9A Reactor vessel 
H9B Pressurizer Vessel 
H9C Containraent/Dryvell 
H9D Pressure Suppression 
H10BATTERIES 
HlOA Lead 
HiOB Nickel Cadmium 
H11A 
HUB 
H11C 
H11D 
HUE 
H11F 
H12 
H12A 
H12B 
H12C 
H12D 
H12E 
Circuit BreaXer 
Ccr. tract or 
Controller 
Starter 
Switch 
Switchgear 
ELECTRICAL CONDUCTORS 
Bus 
Control Cable 
Power Cable 
Signal Cable 
Thermocouple Extension Vire 
Hl3 CONTROL RODS 
HI 4 HEATERS 
H14A Electric 
H14B 
H14C 
HI 5 
H15A 
H15B 
H15C 
H15D 
H15E 
H16 
HJ6A 
H16B 
H16C 
H16D 
H16E 
H16F 
H16G 
H1,6H 
H16J 
Fuel Oil 
Gas 
BLOWERS 
Compressor 
Gas Circulator 
Fart 
Ventilator 
Vacuum 
HEAT EXCHANGERS 
Hea ter/superheater 
Boiler 
Cooler 
Condenses 
Evaporator 
Steam Generator 
Heater/Cooler 
Desuperheater 
Reheater 
- 22 -
H17 CHAKOfc/uisCKASSE MACHINE H24 PIPES. FITTINCS 
H18 DEMINERALIZERS 
H18A Anion 
H18B Mixed Bed 
H18C Cation 
H19 CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISM 
H20 PUMPS 
H20A 
H20B 
H20C 
H20D 
H20E 
H20F 
H20G 
H20H 
H20J 
H20K 
Axial 
Centrifugal 
Diaphragm 
Gear 
Reciprocating 
Radial 
Rotary 
Vane Type 
Electromagnetic 
jet 
H21 TRANSFORMER 
H21A Fower 
H21B Voltage 
H21C Current 
H21D Variable 
H21E isolation 
H21F Pover Step-up 
H21G Pover Step-Dovn 
H22 ELECTRIC BOARDS/PANELS 
H23 TURBINES 
H23A Condensing 
H23B Noncondensing 
H23C Combustion 
H23D Hydro 
H23E Air 
H24A Orifice/Diaphragm 
H24B Nozzle/Safe End 
H24C Rupture Diaphragm 
H24D straight Section 
H24E Thermovell 
H24F Mivers 
H24G Meters (Flow) 
H25 FILTER/STRAINERS 
H25A 
H25B 
H25C 
H25D 
H25E 
H25F 
H25G 
H25H 
H25J 
Membrane 
Mechanical Restriction 
Porous Solid 
Chemical 
Gravity 
Centrifugal 
Electrostatic 
Self-Clean 
Drum 
H26 DTESEI.-GENERATCR ( SETS) 
H26A 2-Stroke in Line 
H26B 2-Stroke "V" 
H26C 4-Stroke in Line 
H26D 4-stroke "V" 
H26E 2-Stroke Radial 
H26F 4-stroke Radial 
H27 sE:;ccK3/i;;sTn. A?JD cc?rrnoL 
H27A 
H27B 
H27C 
H27D 
H27E 
H27F 
H27G 
H27H 
Vibration 
Position 
Pressure 
Plov 
Temperature 
L evel/Frequency 
Neutronic 
Nuclear (Radioprot«) 
[28 MOTORS 
!28A Electric 
28B Hydraulic 
28C Pneuæatic 
:29 VALVES 
30 VALVE OPERATORS 
:30A 
:30B 
:30c 
:30D 
•30E 
30F 
:30G 
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H31 RECTIFIERS 
H31A Charger 
H32 CONTAINMENT IXTERN, STRUCTURE 
H33 FUEL TRANSFERT DEVICE 
H34 ACCUMULATORS 
Electric Motor H 3 4 A Liquid Pressurized 
Hydraulic H 3 4 B li°.nid Unpressurized 
Pneunat./DiaphragVCylinder H 3 4 C G a s 
Solenoid 
Float H 3 5 AIR/GAS DRYERS 
Explosive 
Mechanical (Pressure) 
Comments 
The categories SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS AFFECTED are including 
rather detailed subclasses since this part of the taxonomy is 
intended to cover technical failures as well as human malfunctions. 
When backtracking to find the cause of an abnormal event, a 
technical failure may be identified and localised in terms of 
systems and components affected. If no technical fault is iden-
tified, we have a case of human malfunction and the categories 
then specify the physical contact/interface between the technical 
system and the human activity. It may be identified as the last 
technical item found when backtracking the cause of the event. 
Component identification is considered important for the analysis 
of malfunctions in test, calibration and maintenance, however, 
a very detailed classification not being necessary. 
Correlation/compatibility with other (international) classification 
systems should be emphasized, therefore, the ISPRA classifica-
tions developed/under development are adopted. These classifi-
cations are intended for use in the ISPRA Component Event Data 
Bank, see Mancini et al. 1979. 
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HM COMPONENTS: MODE OF FAILURE 
HMl Demanded change of state is not achieved * 
HM1.1 won't open 
HMl.2 won't close 
HMl.3 neither opens nor closes/does not switch 
HMl.4 fails to start 
HMl.5 fails to stop 
HMl.6 fails to reach design specifications 
HM2 Change in conditions (state) 
HM2.1 Classification as for suddenness and degree: 
HM2.1.1 catastrophic failure 
HM2.1.2 incipient failure 
HM2.2 Classification as for observed state of the com-
ponent : 
HM2.2.1 no output 
HM2.2.2 outside specifications** 
HM2.2.3 operation without request 
HM2.2.4 erratic output (false, oscillating, instability, 
drifting etc. 
The definitions are of general nature and have to 
be properly interpreted for the various items. 
Including failure of item part found and repaired 
during preventive maintenance. 
Comments 
The ISPRA classification is adopted, see Mancini et al. 1979. 
Correlation/compatibility with other (interrational) classification 
systems should be emphasized, therefore, the ISPKA classifica-
tions developed/under development are adopted. These classifi-
cations are intended for use in the ISPRA Component Event Data 
Bank, see Mancini et al. 1979. 
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HC COMPONENTS: CAUSES OF FAILURE 
HCA 
HCA1 
HCA2 
HCA3 
Hca 
HCC 
HCD 
HCD1 
HCD2 
HCE 
HCE1 
HCE2 
HCF 
HCG 
HCH 
HCL 
HCM 
HCN 
HCO 
Engineering 
engineering/design {hardware} 
engineering/design (proced./specificat.} 
other causes related to engineering 
Manufacturing (in workshop) 
Installation/construction (in situ) 
Plant operation 
personnel error 
incorrect procedure/instructions 
Maintenance. Testing. Measuring 
personnel error 
incorrect procedure/instructions 
Material incompatibility (unexpected) 
Expected wear, aging, corrosion, erosion, distortion, 
abrasion 
Abnormal service condition 
Pullution 
Failure caused by other plant devices, by associated 
devices, or by off-site influence. 
Unknown 
Others (HOC) 
Comments 
The ISPRA classification is adopted, see Xancini et al. 1979. 
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HA COMPONENTS: ACTIONS TAKEN 
HA2.1 Corrective Action 
HA2.1.1 Corrective maintenance 
HA2.1.1.1 repair without disassembly 
HA2.1.1.2 repair with partial disassembly 
HA2.1.1.3 repair with total disassembly 
HA2.1.1.4 recalibration, reseal, repack 
HA2.1.1.5 adjust 
HA2.1.1.6 repair part(s) 
HA2.1.1.7 replace part(s) 
HA2.1.1.8 repair component 
HA2.1.1.9 replace component 
tiA2.1.1.10 temporary repair 
HA2.1.1.11 temporary by-pass 
HA2.12 Modification/Redesign of component 
HA2.1.3 Modification of operation duty (a) 
HA2.1.4 Special surveillance (a) 
HA2.1.5 Control of similar equipment 
HA2.2 Administrative Consequences 
HA2.2.1 On Repair Schedule 
HA2.2.1.1. Urgent Repairs 
- urgent repairs that may result from emergen-
cies and are accomplished bypassing normal 
administrative procedures 
- urgent repairs accomplished without bypassing 
normal administrative procedures 
HA2.2.1.2 Not-nrgent Repairs 
- accomplished at a scheduled time 
- accomplished at nearest shut-down 
HA2.2.2 On Plant Operation 
HA2.2.2.1 Forced stop required 
HA2.2.2.2 Stop required at short term 
- repair within 2 days 
- repair within 7 days 
- repair within 14 days 
- repair within 30 days 
HA2.2.2.3 No unscheduled unit shut-down required' 
HA2.2.2.4 Others 
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HA2.2.3 Documentation 
HA2.2.3.1 - Failure reported to architect/engineer 
HA2.2.3.2 - Failure reported to NSSS vendor 
HA2.2.3.3 - Failure reported to consultant 
HA2.2.3.4 - Failure reported to component manufacturer 
HA2.2.3.5 - Failure analysis recommended 
HA2.2.3.6 - Failure analysis performed 
HA2.2.3.7 - Photographs were made 
HA2.2.3.8 - LER submitted 
HA2.2.3.9 - None of the above 
HA2.3 Start-up Restrictions 
HA2.3.1 - No restriction 
HA2.3.2 - Permission by licensing authorities 
HA2.3.3 - Request Licensee Revision 
Comments 
The ISPRA classification is adopted, see Mancini et al. 1979. 
It is identical with that used under the human factors category 
ACTIONS TAKEN: Other actions taken. 
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CONSEQUENCES OF THE EVENT 
Consequent effect on system as stated in category: 
SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS AFFECTED 
System inappropriately put into operation 
Loss of system function 
Degraded system function 
Loss of redundancy: 
Loss of 1 train 
Loss of 2 trains 
Loss of 3 trains 
Loss of more than 3 trains 
No significant effect on system 
Consequent effect on reactor operation: 
No significant effect 
Delayed coupling 
Partial standstill or power reduction 
Turbine trip 
G2.5 Reactor shut-down (automatic/manual trip, forced 
shut-down) 
G2.6 Abnormal off-site releases 
G2.7 Abnormal radiation level in working area 
Comments 
The purpose of this category is not to characterise the human 
malfunction but to indicate the efficiency of the various 
measures for stopping the propagation of the event chain ini-
tiated by the malfunction. The category is based upon that 
used by ISPRA with a few changes. 
G 
Gl 
G l . l 
G1 .2 
G 1 . 3 
G 1 . 4 
G 1 . 4 . 
G 1 . 4 . 
G 1 . 4 . 
G 1 . 4 . 
G 1 . 5 
G2 
G 2 . 1 
G2 .2 
G 2 . 3 
G 2 . 4 
,1 
.2 
.3 
,4 
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J PERSONNEL IDENTIFICATION 
Jl Utility management 
J2 Plant management 
J3 Shift supervisors 
J4 Licensed operators or senior operators 
J5 Non-licensed operations personnel 
J6 Roving operators 
J7 Maintenance and repair personnel: 
J7.1 Mechanical profession 
J7.1 Electrical profession 
J7.2 Electronics profession 
J7.4 Chemical profession 
J7.5 Profession not specified 
J8 Health physics personnel 
J9 Design and fabrication personnel 
J10 Construction personnel 
Jll Contractor and consultant personnel 
J12 Other foreign personnel 
J13 Other not covered above 
J14 Not stated 
Comments 
This category is intended to represent information on the educa-
tional background and organisational relation of the person. 
Implicitly it characterises the actual work situation of the 
person during the event. 
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K PERSONNEL LOCATION 
Kl Central control rooms 
K2 Other control room consoles 
K3 Relay and terminal rooms 
K4 Work on equipment in plant under normal conditions 
K5 Work on equipment in radiologically controlled areas 
K6 Workshop 
K7 Office 
K8 Outdoor 
K9 Other location 
K10 Not stated, not applicable 
Comments 
This category represents a general characterisation of the work 
location during the occurrence of the malfunction. 
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L PERSONNEL TASK 
LI Design and design changes of equipment 
L2 Procedure design and modification 
L3 Fabrication 
L4 Installation 
L5 Inspection 
L6 Operation: 
L6.1 Monitoring 
L6.2 Manual acts, maneuvers and other manual operations 
L6.3 Inventory control 
L6.4 Supervisory control 
L7 Test and calibration: 
L7.1 Getting access to location for work (including 
getting permit) 
L7.2 Preparation of equipment and tools 
L7.3 Execution of the actual test and calibration acti-
vity 
L7.4 Restoration, removal of tools etc. 
L8 Maintenance and repair (modification etc.): 
L8.1 Getting access to location for work (including 
getting permit) 
L8.2 Preparation of equipment and tools 
L8.3 Execution of the actual maintenance activity 
L8.4 Restoration, removal of tools etc. 
L9 Logistics 
L10 Administration: recording, reporting etc. 
Lll Management: resource allocation and supervision 
L12 Other not covered above 
L13 Not stated, not applicable 
Comments 
The identification of the task is important to describe the 
circumstances during which the event occurred. Description of 
elements and structure of a task and correlation with data on 
HUMAN MALFUNCTION MECHANISMS and INTERNAL HUMAN MALFUNCTIONS 
are necessary to predict human performance in new or revised 
work situations. 
The tasks of Test/Calibration and Maintenance/Repair are described 
rather detailed in the present taxonomy, because they were well 
represented in the sample on which the taxonomy has been based 
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and because they are immediately safety related. 
Other safety related tasks e.g. inventory control and supervisory 
control should be considered for extended description in actual 
data collection campaigns. 
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M 
Ml 
Ml.l 
Ml. 2 
Ml. 3 
Ml. 4 
Ml. 5 
M2 
M2.1 
M2.2 
M2.3 
M3 
M4 
M5 
Comments 
This category describes the immediate, observable external effect 
of human malfunction upon the task performance. It reflects 
the way in which the malfunction initiates the consequent chain 
of accidental events. This category and the correlation to cate-
gories INTERNAL HUMAN MALFUNCTION and MECHANISMS OF HUMAN MALFUNC-
TIONS, are important for prediction of the effect of human mal-
function in a specific task and/or system. 
In case of simple human malfunction, there is found a direct 
relation between these three categories and the structure of 
the task, in more complex situations involving a sequence of 
critical human decisions, this is not the case (see comment 
to INTERNAL HUMAN MALFUNCTION). Likewise, in some cases the 
effect cannot be predicted from a task analysis (extraneous 
acts). Therefore, special subcategories are given for extraneous 
acts and complex coincidences. 
EXTERNAL MODE OF MALFUNCTION AS LEADING TO THE STATED 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE EVENT 
The specified or intended task not performed due 
to 
Omission of task 
Omission of act 
Inappropriate, inaccurate performance 
Inappropriate timing 
Actions in wrong sequence 
The effect is due to specific, erroneous acts on 
system under treatment: 
Wrong act executed on correct component, equipment 
Wrong component, equipment 
Wrong time 
The effect is due to extraneous act, i.e. act on 
other system than that under treatment 
The effect is due to coincidence or co-effect with 
other erroneous or normal human activity or technical 
condition. Sneakpath tied to special circumstances 
Not stated, not applicable 
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It is recommended that the content of the category EXTERNAL MODE 
OF MALFUNCTION is extended by future data collection campaigns 
for important safety related tasks as for instance repair and 
test/calibration. This can be done by extending the present cate-
gory or, as it has been dene in this taxonomy, by differentiating 
the description of the task. See the category PERSONNEL TASK. 
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N POTENTIAL FOR SELF-CORRECTION 
Nl Lack of correction by the performing person himself 
due to: 
Nl.l Malfunction not immediately observable 
N1.2 Malfunction not immediately reversible 
N2 Not stated, not applicable 
Comments 
Information on the detection of the malfunction is important, 
since it is tightly coupled to the initiation of an event report, 
and, therefore, may bias the da+.a reported. For instance human 
malfunction which is immediately corrected will not release 
a report, and potential for operators' self-monitoring will 
be an important bias on the data. 
A more elaborate description of the potential for self-correction 
will be important, but should be part of the background descrip-
tion of the task for which event data are collected, not a 
part of the event record. The present members of the category 
has been used to separate the two major bias factors during 
analysis of existing event compilations. 
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P SITUATION FACTORS 
PI Task characteristics, "preparedness 
Pl.l Familiar task on schedule 
PI.2 Familiar task on demand 
PI.3 Unfamiliar task on schedule 
PI.4 Unfamiliar task on demand 
PI.5 Other not covered above 
PI.6 Not stated, not applicable 
P2 Physical environment 
P2.1 Noise 
P2.2 Uncomfortable temperature, humidity, pressure, smell 
etc. 
P2.3 Light 
P2.4 Radiation 
P2.5 Other not covered above 
P2.6 Not stated, not applicable 
P3 Work time characteristics 
P3.1 Day shift 
P3.2 Night shift 
P3.3 In beginning of shift 
P3.4 In middle of shift 
P3.5 In end of shift 
P3.6 Not s t a t e d , not appl icable 
Comments 
Information on factors related to the general work situation 
which will modify performance and probability of human malfunction 
is important. In the present context, the categories SITUATION 
FACTORS and PERFORMANCE SHAPING FACTORS are used to describe 
the more general work conditions, such as noise, temperature, 
workload, etc., and other factors which are generally affecting 
the state of an operator and which are not tied to a causal 
relation among events and acts, but rather contributing an overall 
modification of the performance. Physiological and psychological 
factors related to individuals are not recommended for inclusion 
into an event reporting scheme. 
Important SITUATION FACTORS are related to the "preparedness" 
of the operator for the specific event. The taxonomy in this 
respect includes a distinction between familiar and unfamiliar 
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task and between scheduled task and task on demand. 
A familiar task is a task which is performed frequently enough 
to enable the person to perform it by know-how, i.e. without 
the need for special planning or modification of procedures. 
An unfamiliar task is a task which needs special planning or 
consideration of modification of procedures or normal work prac-
tise, or is so infrequent that use of preplanned written instruc-
tions is needed. 
On schedule refers to the situation when special procedures 
are planned ahead or existing procedures can be studied and 
rehearsed, or the task is initiated by the operator according 
to a time schedule. 
On demand represents the situation when planning has to be done 
concurrently with task performance and typically is based on 
the operators diagnosis and immediate decisions, i.e. the task 
is called for unexpectedly by the system, e.g. interfering with 
an already running task." 
The distinction between SITUATION FACTORS and PERFORMANCE SHAPING 
FACTORS is made only to separate the information which can be 
recorded immediately by check lists from information which depend 
on human factors analysis, respectively. 
Guidelines for use of the subcategories under "Task characteri-
stics" are presented in Pedersen et al. 1981. 
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HA ACTIONS TAKEN 
HA1 In order to improve human f u n c t i o n s : 
HA1.1 Reinforcement of i n s t r u c t i o n s 
HA1.2 Revis ion of procedures and i n s t r u c t i o n s 
HA1.3 Modif icat ion of equipment des ign 
HA1.4 Modif icat ion of work planning 
HA1.5 Modif icat ion of work s i t u a t i o n 
HA1.6 Modif icat ion of organ i sa t ion 
HA1.7 Retraining and rehearsal 
HA1.8 Redesign o f t r a i n i n g program 
KA1.9 Other not s t a t e d 
HA2 Other a c t i o n s taken: 
HA2 .1 Corrective Action 
HA2.1.1 Corrective maintenance 
HA2.1.1.1 repair without disassembly 
HA2 . 1 . 1 . 2 repair with partial disassembly 
HA2 . 1 . 1 . 3 repair with total disassembly 
HA2.1.1.4 recalibration, reseal, repack 
HA2 . 1 . 1 . 5 adjust 
HA2.1.1.6 repair part(s) 
HA2.1.1.7 replace part(s) 
HA2 . 1 . 1 . 8 repair component 
HA2 . 1 . 1 . 9 replace component 
HA2.1.1.10 temporary repair 
HA2.1.1.11 temporary by-pas s 
HA2 . 1 . 2 Modification/Redesign of component 
HA2 . 1 . 3 Modification of operation duty (a) 
HA2.1.4 Special surveillance (a) 
HA2.1.5 Control of similar equipment 
HA2.2 Administrative Consequences 
HA2.2.1 On Repair Schedule 
HA2 . 2 . 1 . 1 Urgent Repairs 
- urgent repairs that may result from em«agencies and *-r* 
accomplished bypassing normal administrative procedures 
• urgent repairs accomplished without bypassing normal ad-
ministrative procedures 
HA2.2.1.2 ' Not-urgent Repairs 
- accomplished at a scheduled time 
- accomplished at nearest shut-down 
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HA2.2.2 Oa Float Operatiom 
HA2.2.2.1 Force« step required 
HA2.2.2.2 Stop require« at skort tei 
• repair »Ukia, Z day« 
. - " •• T ** 
HA2.2.2.3 Ho —acfcedoied w i t sLot-d—• reooired 
HA2.2.2.4 Uthers 
HA2.2.3 
HA2.2.3.1 - Failore reported to ArcaiUct/eafiaeer 
HA2.2.3.2 - Failore reported te NSSS veador 
HA2.2.3.3 - Faifcu* reported to 
HA2.2.3.4 - Faihara reported to c« 
HA2.2.3.S - Faiau* aaarfsis reci 
HA2.2.3.6 - Faike*e aaalysis 
HA2.2.3.7 
HA2.2.3.8 - L E R 
KA2.2.3.9 - N o æ o f t k e 
HA2.3 Start-op Restrictioas 
HA2.3.1 - N o restrictiom 
HA2.3.2 - Permissioa by Kceasiag authorities 
HA2.3.3 - Request Liceasee Re«isiom 
Comments 
This is a category describing the actions taken in order zz 
remedy the malfunction. 
The first subcategory covers actions particularly aiming at 
itnprcving human functions, the second covers other actions and 
is identical with the ISPKA classification already given under 
HA COMPONENTS: ACTIONS TAKEN. 
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Q INTERNAL HUMAN MALFUNCTION 
Beware: Internal human malfunction does not necessarily 
imply a failure OP error on the part of the man. 
Ql Detection: Operator does not respond to a demand. 
Q2 Identification of system state: Operator responds 
but misinterprets the system state. 
Q3 Decision: 
03.1 Selection of goal: Operator responds to properly 
identified system state, but aims at wrong goal (e.g. 
operation continuity instead of safety). 
Q3.2 Selection of system target state: Operator selects 
an improper system target state to pursue proper 
goal (e.g. he decreases power to 80% instead of shut-
down ) . 
Q3.3 Selection of task: The operator selects a task, an 
activity which will not bring the plant to the intended 
target state. 
Q4 Action: 
04.1 Procedure: The sequence of actions performed is in-
appropriate or incorrectly coordinated for the task 
chosen. 
04.2 Execution: The physical activity related to the steps 
in the procedure is incorrect. 
Q4.3 Communication: Written or verbal messages are given 
incorrectly. 
05 Not stated, not applicable 
Comments 
The operator's task which is specified in the category PERSONNEL 
TASK in terms referring to the operational requirements of the 
plant will require some internal, mental data processing or 
decision function. 
The category INTERNAL HUMAN MALFUNCTION is a causality-ordered 
sequence of human decision elements and is used to characterise 
that step/element in the decision sequence which was inappropri-
ately performed or not performed at all due to a habitual bypass. 
There is basically some ambiguity in this classification: 
Firstly, the description.in terms of identification, decision 
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and execution can be done at several levels of detail in the 
task description. It is intended that the use in event classifi-
cation should be kept at a high level referring to the overall 
task description. A repair task can be taken as example: the 
diagnostic part of this task: to find the fault, should, if 
incorrectly performed, be classified as "identification of system 
state". 
Alternatively, assume that the diagnosis has been correctly 
performed, that the repair man's proper intention of component 
replacement has been stated, and that he is performing the actions 
necessary for the fault remedy. During this phase of activities 
the repair man performs actions in wrong order of succession, 
because he does not identify the real state of the system under 
repair: this should be classified as "procedure". 
This is a matter of convention - but the position taken here 
can be defended, partly from the fact that information for classi-
fication at a very detailed level generally is not present in 
event reports, partly from the usefulness of the classification 
results for improvement of work aids. 
Secondly, ambiguity is caused by the fact that malfunction in 
the first phases of a decision will frequently lead to inappro-
priate decisions later in the sequence. To describe such sequen-
ces, detailed time line analysis and identification of all criti-
cal decisions are necessary, as described by Pew et al (1981), 
but this analysis must be based on very careful data collection 
including interviews of personnel (which is only feasible if 
it can be done immediately after the event, for instance by 
studies on training simulators.) 
In general, the information cannot be obtained and in the present 
taxonomy we suggest that classification is only done for the 
first element of the human decision sequence which is inappro-
priately performed or shunted out by stereotyped bypass. Since 
most event reports are backtracking the course of events to 
an explaining plausible cause, this first malfunction sending 
the operator off the proper track, is the most likely to be 
represented in the record. This means that in more complex situ-
ations, the causal relation from the internal human malfunction 
and the related error mechanisms to the external effect of the 
malfunction will not be preserved in the recorded data. However, 
from a view point of statistical quantification or generalization 
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in terms of improvements, this is not too important in the present 
context since the variability and degrees of freedom in human 
responses after a wrong decision - say an identification - is 
so high that they can only be characterized after detailed 
studies. 
It must be emphasized that the category INTERNAL HUMAN MALFUNCTION 
does not take into account any cause of the malfunction and 
that the term "malfunction" does not imply in itself a "human 
error". 
The malfunction can be caused by external conditions or events, 
such as interfering people, wrong orders, ordered absence etc., 
which are all considered separately under CAUSES. 
The members of the present category are derived from a model 
of human decision sequence which is described in detail in Rasmus-
sen (1974) and which has been used to derive the guidelines 
for analysis presented in Pedersen et al. 1981. For. reference 
the model is illustrated in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Model of human decision sequence. 
Reproduced from Rasmussen, 1976. 
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R CAUSES OF HUMAN MALFUNCTION 
Event or short term condition taking active part 
as a link in the causal chain of events 
Rl External events: 
Rl.l Distraction by system and/or environment 
Rl.2 Distraction by other persons: Questions, message, 
noise 
R2 Excessive task demand in the specific situation: 
R2.1 Physical demand, time, force, etc. 
R2.2 State information inadequate, wrong 
R2.3 Background information related to the specific situation 
(knowledge, instruction) inadequate or wrong 
R3 Operator incapacitated: (sick, injured, etc.) 
No external cause: 
Intrinsic normal human variability; spontaneous human 
error 
Intentional act 
Sabotage 
Other not stated above 
Not stated, not applicable 
Identification of possible external causes is important for 
many reasons. First of all, there is a natural tendency when 
analysing the chain of events implied in maloperation of a system 
to accept a human error as the explanation if an inappropriate 
human act is met by the causal backtracking; the tendency is 
natural since it is difficult to continue the causal backtracking 
"through" a human performance, and also it is generally accepted 
that it is "human to err". It is, therefore, important that 
special care is taxen to identify possible external causes as 
part of an event analysis. 
Common sense definition of causes is very ambiguous and, there-
fore, in the present context must be clarified. From a point 
of view of quantification of human error it is beneficial if 
the definition of cause is clearly related to the frequency 
of the events analysed. Therefore, we define as a cause an event 
or a change in the man's normal work condition which acts as 
a causal precedent to his inappropriate 'action. General conditions 
R4 
R4. 
R4. 
R4. 
R5 
R6 
1 
2 
3 
Comments 
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which may affect his error proneness such as normal, but high 
noise level, inappropriate ergonomic design, fatigue during 
nighf shifts etc., are all considered SITUATION FACTORS or PERFOR-
MANCE SHAPING FACTORS which influence the error probability, 
but - according to our definition - does not cause errors. 
The present members of the category "causes" should be taken 
as illustrative; they are based on a limited number of analyses, 
generally reliable information on causes is not to be found 
in event reports due to the reasons discussed above. Special 
guidelines for identification of causes as part of event analysis 
will be developed within the present CSNI work, based on the 
analysis published by Griffon (1981). 
More general guidelines for use of the category R: CAUSES OF 
HUMAN MALFUNCTION are presented in Pedersen et al. 1981. 
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S MECHANISMS OF HUMAN MALFUNCTION 
SI Discrimination 
This group is related to the man's ability to discrimi-
nate between and select the proper mode of control 
of his activities. The subcategories of malfunction 
mechanisms are characterized by interference between 
the man's repertoire of stereotyped habitual - and 
often subconscious - responses on one side and on 
the other side aspects of the actual work situation 
during infrequent and unique task demands. 
51.1 Stereotype (skill) fixation 
Definition: Man operates in skill-based domain. 
He does not recognize a situation calling for 
attention and caution. 
(Cues for recognition may not be present or may 
' be overlooked, this is characterized by the catego-
ries: CAUSE OF HUMAN MALFUNCTION, or INTERNAL 
HUMAN MALFUNCTION) 
51.2 Familiar association short-cut 
Definition: It is recognized that conscious identifi-
cation of the situation is needed but familiar 
cues activate incorrect intention and task in 
man. It is not recognized that knowledge based 
evaluation and planning is needed. 
51 .3 Stereotype take-over 
Definition: Task or act according to proper inten-
tion, but "absentmindedness" during performance 
leads to relapse to stereotype action links related 
to different act or task. 
SI.4 Lack of recognition of familiar pattern 
Definition: Familiar pattern relevant for the 
situation is not recognised, higher level knowledge-
-based evaluation or planning is unnecessarily 
and inappropriately applied. 
52 Input information processing 
The subcategories are related to the man's activities 
in obtaining information. 
That an information output malfunction has occurred 
is classified under: 
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INTERNAL HUMAN MALFUNCTION 
Erroneous function in action 
Communication given incorrectly 
52.1 Information not recieved/sought 
Definition: Cues do not activate man because sensi-
tivity/attention is insufficient for present infor-
mation level. 
52.2 Misinterpretation of information 
Definition: Response is based on wrong apprehension 
of information such as misreading of text or instru-
ment, misunderstanding of verbal message. 
52.3 Assumptions replace search for information 
Definition: Response is inappropriately based 
on information supplied by the operator (by recall, 
guesses, etc.) which does not correspond with 
information available from outside. 
53 Recall 
53.1 Forgetting isolated act or function 
Definition: Operator forgets to perform an isolated 
act or function, i.e., an act or function which 
is not cued by the functional context or is not 
having immediate effect upon the mental or motor 
sequence. 
53.2 Mistake among alternatives 
Definition: Simple choice of wrong alternative, 
a category is correctly used but by wrong member, 
e.g., mistakes of up/down, +/-, left/right, A/B, 
open/closed, locked/unlocked. 
53.3 Other slips of memory 
Definition: Erroneous recall of reference data 
values; names, item; need for actions, etc. 
Inferences 
This group is covering problems of linear thought 
in causal nets. 
54 Side effects or latent conditions not adequately 
considered 
Definition: The man is in a less familiar situation 
characterized by knowledge-basea, goal-controlled 
performance. He performs erroneously during func-
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tional inferences: The situation is not properly 
identified, the consequences of an event chain 
are not adequately predicted or an improper intention 
is chosen or latent conditions are not adequately 
considered. Consequently, the task or the intended 
goal is not fulfilled or adverse side effects 
occur or a combination of these consequences. 
(Can be due to oversight, lack of knowledge etc., 
this is characterized by the category: CAUSE OF 
HUMAN MALFUNCTION. 
55 Physical coordination 
55.1 Motor variability 
Definition: Lack of manual precision, too big/small 
force applied, inappropriate timing. Including 
deviations from "good craftsmanship". 
55.2 Topographic, spatial orientation inadequate 
Definition: In spite of man's correct intention and his correct 
recall of identification marks, tagging etc., he unawaringly 
performs task/act in the wrong place or on the wrong object, 
because he is following his immediate sense of locality, this, 
however, not being applicable (not updated, surviving imprints 
of old habits etc.). 
56 Other identified mechanisms 
57 Mechanism not identified 
Comments 
This category represents an attempt to formulate a set of generic, 
task independent human error mechanisms. The related categories 
EXTERNAL MODE OF MALFUNCTION and INTERNAL HUMAN MALFUNCTION 
are tightly task related and reflect basically the effect of 
inappropriate human performance upon the task. To evaluate human 
performance during design of new tasks and improved work condi-
tions, including man-machine interfaces, it is important to 
identify human malfunction mechanisms in generic terms relating 
inappropriate task performance to features of the psychological 
mechanisms which are the basis of the performance and to limiting 
properties of such mechanisms. 
A human is capable of performing the same task in various differ-
ent ways depending upon the state of trailing, the subjective 
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formulation of the goals and performance criteria, and consequent-
ly the role of the psychological mechanisms will be very person 
and situation dependent. Inappropriate task performance reflects 
a mismatch between task requirements and the human resources 
applied, and if the nature of this mismatch can be identified 
- irrespectively of the underlying cause - important information 
on the psychological mechanism applied and its limiting properties 
with respect to the task can be obtained. 
The present category is intended to characterize cases of such 
resource/demand mismatch and is based on a model of operator 
performance derived from a preliminary analysis of 200 event 
reports (Rasmussen 1980). The structure of the model is illustrat-
ed in figure 4. 
Guidelines for use of the category S: MECHANISMS OF HUMAN MAL-
FUNCTIONS are presented in Pedersen et al 1981. 
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Figure 4. Model of human data processes and typical malfunctions. 
Reproduced from Rasmussen, 1980. 
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T PERFORMANCE SHAPING FACTORS 
TI Subjective goals and intentions: 
Tl.l Aspects of task performance are given exaggerated 
promotion e.g., speed, thoroughness, accuracy, 
effort to avoid delay 
T1.2 Task content is inappropriately extended 
T1.3 Task perceived as secondary 
T1.4 Conflicting goals 
T1.5 Other not covered above 
T1.6 Subcategory not applicable 
T2 Mental load, resources: 
T2.1 Inadequate ergonomic design of work place 
T2.2 Overlapping tasks 
T2.3 Inadequate general education 
T2.4 Inadequate general task training and instruction 
T2.5 Other not covered above 
T2.6 Subcategory not applicable 
T3 Affective factors: 
T3.1 Social factors 
T3.2 Insufficient load, boredom 
T3.3 Time pressure 
T3.4 Fear of failure 
T3.5 Other not covered above 
T3.6 Subcategory not applicable 
Comments 
See comments to SITUATION FACTORS. 
Guidelines for identifying performance shaping factors will 
be developed, based on the analysis in Griffon (1981). 
Guidelines for use of the subcategories under "Mental load, 
resources" are presented in Pedersen et al 1981. 
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DATA COLLECTION FORMATS 
Preprinted forms for data collection in plant and examples of 
their use are presented in the document SIND0C(81)15. 
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